Avraham Chaim Bloomenstiel
3 Teves 5786 (Dec. 23, 2025)
QUESTION:
The bakery in our neighborhood ran a promotion in which anyone who bought challos every erev Shabbos in Adar 5785 would be entered into a raffle. The winner of the raffle would receive free Shabbos challos (4 loaves per Shabbos) for a year starting with the first Shabbos in Nissan 5785 until the last Shabbos in Adar 5786. I usually buy four challos for $3.75 per loaf on erev Shabbos from the grocery store. I wanted to enter the raffle, so I specifically bought my challos for every Shabbos in Adar 5785 from the bakery. Their challos are gourmet, and they charge about $7.85 per loaf.
The owner of the bakery called me right after the last Shabbos in Adar 5785 to tell me that I won the raffle. She asked for my address so that she could have the challos delivered every erev Shabbos. That was the only conversation we had about the raffle. After three months, I stopped receiving challos. I called the owner several times and never heard back. I finally got an apologetic email saying that she wouldn’t be able to keep giving me the free challos. She said that they could barely meet their current paying orders and, due to the rising cost of ingredients, it wasn’t practical. Do I have a valid taaneh against her?
ANSWER:
- The Permissibility of Raffles
It is worth briefly addressing the permissibility of raffles before getting to ikkar shailo. The casting of lots appears throughout Tanakh and Chazal to determine one’s role or entitlement to property.[1] However, lotteries become problematic when they result in monetary losses to one or more of the participants.
The Gemara in Sanhedrin 24b invalidates a mesachek b’kubia, a dice-player, as a kosher witness. The reason for his invalidation is a machlokes between Rami bar Chama and Rav Sheishes. According to Rami Bar Chama, it is due to asmachta, meaning that those who lose to him never really intended to give up their money. This makes the dice-player into a robber. Rav Sheishis holds that the reason is because the dice-player leads an unproductive life, doing nothing to build the world, and is therefore not trustworthy.
The Shulchan Aruch applies this rationale to all gambling, paskening in C.M. 370:1-2 like the Rambam who follows Rami Bar Chama, that a gambler commits gezeilah mid’rabbanon any time he takes a loser’s money. The Rema in C.M. 207:13 and 370:3 paskens like Tosafos who follows Rav Sheshes. The Rema therefore permits occasional gambling or gambling when those involved have some other occupation (later Acharonim, although they agree with the Rema, are not so eager to permit gambling[2]).
Do raffles or lotteries run afoul of these halachos? It seems clear that raffles and lotteries pose no problems for Ashkenazim. They don’t appear problematic for Sefardim either. Rav Ovadya Hadaya, ztz”l, a Sefardi posek, draws a sharp distinction between gambling and raffles in Shu”t Yaskil Avdi VIII, Y.D. 5:3. When gamblers are playing against each other, each one plays to win. Each gambler has the full expectation that he can use his knowledge and skill to prevail over the other players. But raffles don’t work that way. Given the probabilities involved, everyone buys their tickets knowing they will probably lose. Because the players don’t interact with each other and there is no skill involved, they also have no reason to assume than anyone has an advantage over his fellow. Therefore, there is no asmachta, no issur of gezeila mid’rabbanon, and even the Mechaber himself would permit Sephardi participation in a raffle or lottery.[3] Rav Ovadya Yosef ztz”l in Yabia Omer 7:6 disagrees with the Yaskil Avdi and equates playing the lottery with mesachek b’kubia. Rav Yosef’s psak is difficult and does not appear to have been widely accepted.[4]
Being that everyone involved in this shailo is Asheknazi, I write under the assumption that our raffle poses no halachic issue.
- Mechusrei Amana Under C.M. 204:8
At first glance, our situation resembles C.M. 204:8, when someone reneges on a promised gift to a friend. This resemblance is deceptive; the two situations are not alike at all. Our case does not involve a promise to give a gift. The shoeles davka spent $157.00 buying gourmet challos from the baker (5 shabbosos in Adar x 4 loaves x $7.85). This results in her having spent $82 more than she would have normally spent on challos in that month. The extra $82 was spent specifically to enter the raffle. Our case appears more similar to a shailo of kinyan by way of goral, which is brought in the Shulchan Aruch C.M. 173:2 and nosei kelim (this will be discussed in the next section).
For reasons relevant in the conclusion section below, I should point out that even were this a situation of a promised gift, there would be no issue of mechusrei amana. The Mechaber paskens in 204:8 that mechusrei amana is only relevant to small gifts because the recipient relies upon the giver’s promise. However, there is no mechusrei amana by large gifts because there is no semichas daas; the recipient doesn’t take the promise seriously.[5]
However, if the person to whom the gift is promised is poor, then the promise is a neder mitzvah from which the promisor cannot renege. See C.M. 125:5 and Y.D. 258:12. For the purposes of this halacha, the Shulchan Aruch C.M. 125:5 holds like the Mordechai and defines an oni is anyone who does not have 200 zuz to his name.[6]
I know the shoeles of our question and she is not an oni. Therefore, the only question is whether the gift is large or small. The bakery owner promised the shoeles four loaves of challah for each Shabbos for a year. Between 1 Nissan 5785 and 1 Nissan 5785 there are 50 Shabbasos. Taking out Shabbos Chol HaMoed Pesach leaves 49 Shabbasos on which the winner was to receive challos. Four loaves at $7.85 per loaf for 49 Shabbosos yields a prize value of $1,538.60. Nireh li, this is a large gift under the circumstances.[7] By a large gift, there is no mechusrei amana.
To summarize: as of now, this does not appear to be a situation of a promised gift. But even if it was, there would still be no mechusrei amana (I have more to say on this but will save it for the conclusion section below).
- Goral & Kinyan
Neither the Mishna, Gemara, Rishonim, nor the Shulchan Aruch directly address acquisition by way of raffle. However, there are discussions about dividing property through casting lots. Bava Basra 106b asks if brothers may divide up parcels of land from their father’s estate by using lots to determine which sibling receives which plot. R’ Eliezar learns that the lot itself can convey rights in the property from the fact that the initial division of Eretz Yisroel among the shevatim was conducted by casting lots.
The Rishonim disagree as to what kind of rights were actually conveyed through this process. The Rambam, Shecheinim 2:11 holds that the moment the lots are drawn, the kinyan takes place and title passes to the winner. The Shu”t HaRosh 98 disagrees, holding that the lot only gives the winner the first right to make a kinyan on the property. Ownership takes place only when the kinyan is completed.
The Shulchan Aruch C.M. 173:2 paskens like the Rambam and other Rishonim who hold that the lot itself completes the kinyan. The Rema follows the Rosh that the lot only determines who has the first right to make a a kinyan on the item. The lot does not itself constitute a kinyan.
Unfortunately, the dinim of goral are, like C.M. 204:8, not terribly helpful for our shailo. The casting of lots described in the Gemara and in the division of Eretz Yisroel were both situations in which everyone involved had a preexisting interest. The lots were only used to apportion the land among those who already had rights to it. The Shvus Ya’akov III:162 (cited also in Pischei Teshuva 173:2 and Chiddushei R’Akiva Eiger to C.M. 173:2) writes that a goral only conveys an interest if it is conducted in the same manner as the goral carried out to divide Eretz Yisroel. Our modern raffles and lotteries are not comparable to the lotteries describe in Bava Basra 106b or in Choshen Mishpat 173:2, and they do not give the winner any kind of rights in the prize.
Even if our challah raffle did qualify as a goral under C.M. 173:2, it would only convey the first right to make a kinyan on the challah (the shitto of the Rema). However, that presents another problem. At the time our shoeles won her years-supply of challah, the challah did not yet exist. It was a davar shelo bo le-olam. Even if the raffle conveyed an interest in a year’s supply of challah, the baker couldn’t be makneh anything to the winner because the challah did not yet exist.
In many places the Gemara discusses whether it is possible to convey ownership of a davar shelo bo le-olam, an item that does not yet exist.[8] The halacha is that it is not possible to be makneh a davar shelo bo le-olam. See Choshen Mishpat 209:4.
- Sitomta and Hischayavus
The challah prize in this raffle was neither a gift promised to the winner nor an acquisition by goral. It is possible, however, that the win could be validated by situmta. After all, everyone assumes that the results of a raffle are binding.
However, we must again deal with the question of davar shelo bo le-olam. There is a machlokes Rishonim as to whether or not a situmta works to acquire a davar shelo bo le-olam. The Maharam MiRuttenberg and Shu”t HaRosh 13 hold that a situmta is effective, but Rabbeinu Yechiel and Rabbeinu Peretz (brought in the Mordechai, Shabbos, 472 and 473) disagree.[9] The majority of Acharonim agree with the Maharam MiRuttenberg and the Rosh that a stumta is effective even if it is only with words.[10]
In our situation, however, it is possible that even Rabbeinu Yechiel and Rabbeinu Peretz would agree that this situmta is valid. Shu”t Maharshdam C.M. 280 holds that a situmta is sufficient to create hischayavus, personal obligations. Later poskim agree with this Maharshdam. One could argue that the bakery owner has obligated herself through situmta to bakes challos for the winner for an entire year. I do not have much confidence in this argument, though. The promotion was advertised as “win a year’s supply of challos” not “we will bake and delivery challah to you for a year.”
Moreover, I am not certain that there is any actual situmta involved. The winner did not buy a raffle ticket or do any action out of the ordinary other than giving her name to the cashier when checking out. The act of buying the challah was commonplace. She did it every Friday. This isn’t the routine was way of conducting a lottery or raffle. Also, the money that the winner spent on the gourmet challos is the same amount she would have spent if she bought the gourmet challos from that bakery on any other Friday.
Without a clear situmta, we don’t have any kinyan or hischayavus.
- Conclusion
It is very difficult to find any certain basis for a taaneh against the bakery owner. The winner never acquired any definite interest in the year’s supply of challah, neither by way of kinyan, goral, or situmta. At best, any interest the winner had is b’safek, which is not enough to take money away from the baker (ain safek motzi miyedei vadai).
If there was never any interest acquired, then what was the relationship between the baker and the winner? Was it just a promise to give a gift? If so, then as described above it was a promise to give a large gift and there is no mechusrei amana on such a promise. Nevertheless, it is mistaber that there is an issue of mechusrei amana. The promise of free challos didn’t come out of the blue. This was a raffle and the winner, relying on the promise of the baker, expended some effort for her chance to win. This demonstrates that there was more semichas daas involved than by a mere promise to give a large gift. Therefore, there is certainly muchusrei amana by the baker.
There may also be a valid taaneh of geneivas daas. The winner could claimthat the baker enticed her into buying challos with the false promise of possibly winning a year’s supply of free challah. If true, then the winner would only have a taaneh for $82.00, the amount the winner spent beyond her regular challah budget in Adar 5785 for the chance to win. The winner received free challah for 13 Shabbasos after winning, which is $408.20 worth of challah. This more than compensates the winner for the $82.00 she spent to enter the raffle.
Nireh li, this whole arrangement was doomed by its own informality. When the winner won the challos, the baker should have met with her and made an explicit hischayavus by kinyan or shtar as brought in C.M. 60:6. Alternatively, the winner should have insisted on a written commitment.[11]
[1] See, for example, Vayikra 16:18; I Shmuel 14:42-43; I Divrei HaYamim 24:5, 25:8; 26:13; Nechemya 11:1; Mishlei 16:33, 18:18; Bava Basra 106bl Sanhedrin 17a, 43b.
[2] See Mogen Avraham 322:8 and Machtzis HaShekel; Prei Megadim, Eishel Avraham 322:8. Even if permitted mi-ikkar hadin, Teshuvos HaRivash 432 decries gambling as morally repulsive.
[3] Many poskim agree with the Yaskil Avdi and offer additional reasons to permit. See Teshuvos VeHanhagos IV:11 and Mishneh Halachos XV:176.
[4] Rav Ovadya ztz’l attempts to draw many distinctions between lotteries when pooled funds are won and those when an object is being raffled to prove that a lottery for a pooled cash prize is domeh to mesachek b’kubia. Bikhvod rav Toraso ukevodo, I do not find compelling nafka minas in these distinctions.
[5] Although the Rishonim appear to learn that the deciding factor is the daas of the recipient, it is possible to say instead that it is the giver’s intent that matters. Perhaps, by a large gift, the giver is not sincere in his promise and is therefore not bound by it. This idea is brought in the Levush 241:1 and, at first blush, appears to make more sense than saying that the giver’s ability to retract depends upon the recipient’s daas. The Sema 241:4 mentions this approach but brings dissenting views. The Aruch HaShulchan 204:5 is explicit that the daas of the recipient is dispositive.
[6] Later acharonim agree with the Mechaber. See, for example, Shut Yehudah Yaaleh I OC 83, II Even HaEzer & Choshen Mishpat 44; Rav Pealim IV YD 2; Kol HaMevaser I:53.
[7] Because the issue here is a promise made to an ashir, the only issue is whether there is semichas daas. The definition of a large gift will therefore depend on the circumstances and expectations of the parties. It seems to me that anyone would consider a gift of this amount from a business to a customer to be “large.” When a gift is promised to a poor person, which creates a neder, the Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 253 says that a kikar b’fundyon mi-arba se’ein b’sela is the largest “small gift.” This is a loaf large enough to provide for two meals. See Shabbos 118a.
[8] See Yevamos 93a and Kiddushin 62b.
[9] See Kovetz Shiurim, Bava Basra 276 for a possibly explanation of their disagreement.
[10] Shu”t Maharsham III:307, d.h. Aval; Shu”t Shoel uMaishiv, Kamma II:39; Shu”t Divreo Chaim II:26.
[11] It is the norm even in civil law for raffle and lottery winners to enter into an agreement to formalize the commitment. The absence of such an agreement in our case leads me to further doubt the existence of any valid situmta.
